New Zealand and the Vietnam War by Roberto Rabel

Author:Roberto Rabel [Rabel, Roberto]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History
Publisher: Auckland University Press
Published: 2004-12-31T16:00:00+00:00

Police and protesters struggle during the ‘Paritai Drive incident’, 29 October 1967. NEW ZEALAND HERALD COLLECTION, EPH-B-VIETNAM-1967-01, ATL.

The October demonstrations and the troop increase did nothing to shake Holyoake’s conviction that Vietnam had become an electoral asset. In briefing his caucus in early November about a forthcoming by-election in Palmerston North, he urged them to take the offensive by making Vietnam the subject of Parliament’s next debate ‘and continue this attack on the Opposition at the by-election’. Holyoake added that ‘the Progressive Youth Movement was a communist dominated organisation and suggested that this fact would be made public at by-election’.119 And Holyoake did not hesitate to personally take the offensive on Vietnam. The very next day in Parliament, he repeatedly challenged Opposition members to give a direct response to the question: ‘Would a Labour Government withdraw New Zealand troops from Vietnam?’ No one on the Labour benches took up his challenge.120

As the end of the year approached, this confidence that the government was winning the Vietnam debate extended to officials, for whom it was a matter of professional and intellectual judgement rather than political interest. Laking ably summarised External Affairs’ assessment of the nature of the debate to date:

The question of New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam has engendered more public debate than any other foreign policy issue. But the debate served many useful purposes. It underlined for New Zealanders that their country’s security was bound up in the security of Asia – in other words, it made them more than ever aware of the realities of their changed international position. During it the basic and tested principles of New Zealand’s foreign policy were of course called in question, principles such as resistance to aggression, defence of the rights of small states and participation in collective security arrangements. But out of the debate came a general acceptance of the rightness of these principles and of the importance of adhering to them at all times. More than that, it came to be generally understood that New Zealand’s intervention in the Vietnam War was in full conformity with them, and of course with our changed international role. Any disturbance of these principles, which is what a premature withdrawal from Vietnam would be, could therefore be received by the New Zealand public at large only with dismay and recrimination.121

Its critics, however, would have argued that the government had avoided a real debate about the principles on which the Vietnam commitment was based.

In fact, by late 1967 public apathy seemed to outweigh both support for and opposition to the Vietnam commitment. The protests in October would barely have registered but for the Paritai Drive incident. Similarly, when National lost the Palmerston North by-election in early December, this was put down largely to the flagging economy.122

The government had continued to fare better than its opponents on the Vietnam front. It had increased the New Zealand force commitment without incurring undue adverse public reaction. It had retained press support, albeit with some qualifications. It had drawn more criticism from the churches, but they did not present a united front on the issue.

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